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THREE MEN AND A BABY:
SECOND-PARENT ADOPTIONS AND
THEIR IMPLICATIONS
Society ought to grant legal recognition, by permitting an adop-
tion, to the relationship between a child and a person who functions
as that child's parent.' In many instances, this would advance the best
interests of the child.! The highest courts of three states have already
granted joint adoptions to two unmarried people who functioned as
parents to a child. 3
 In each of these instances, one of the parents
already had a legally recognized parent-child relationship with the child
by virtue of being the child's biological parent.' Even though the letter
of the law in each state prohibited biological parents from sharing
parental rights and responsibilities with adoptive parents, each court
looked beyond the language of the statute to its purpose, which is to
advance the best interests of the child, and allowed the adoptions.'
Each state's statute in effect provided that the biological parent lost all
parental rights and responsibilities with regards to the child upon the
child's adoption. 6
 Yet, in each instance, the court placed primary ern-
I See Katherine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal
Alternatives When the Premise of the. Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 883 (1984);
Suzanne Bryant, Second Parent Adoption: A Model Brief 2 Dtnot. J. GEN. L. & POL'Y 233, 234 (1995);
Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of
Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 Gm. L.J. 459, 524, 575 (199(1).
2
 See infra notes 161-207 and accompanying text for a discussion of how allowing these
adoptions could advance the best interests of the child.
3 See In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 315, 316, 321 (Mass. 1993); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397,
398 (N.Y. 1995); In re 628 A.2d 1271, 1272 (Vt, 1993).
4 See In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 316; In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 398; In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d
at 1272.
5 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 6 (1994); N.Y. Dom. REL. Law § 117 (McKinney 1988); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 448 (1989); In re Thmmy, 619 N.E.2d at 321; In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 401,
404, 405-06; In re B,L.V.B., 628 A.2d at 1273 & n.1, 1274, 1276.
6 See MASS. GEN. Laws ch. 210, § 5; N.Y. Dom. REL. Law § 117; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 448;
In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 321; In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 401; In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d at 1273.
Those parental rights include: the right to custody of the child; to discipline the child; to make
decisions about education, medical treatment and religious upbringing; to name the child; to
benefit from the child's earnings and services; to speak for the child; and to assert or waive the
child's rights and the right to determine who may visit the child and to place the child in another's
care. See Bartlett, supra note I, at 884. Parental responsibilities, on the other hand, include the
obligation to care for the child, support him or her financially, see to his or her education and
provide him or her with proper medical care. See id. at 885. Parents also have the duty to control
the child, and if they fail in this duty they may be required to answer for the child's wrongdoings.
See id.
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phasis on the best interests of the child, which was the legislative intent
behind the provision, and hence allowed the rights and responsibilities
of the biological parent to continue, while permitting an adoptive
parent to gain parental rights and responsibilities.?
Other courts should follow this lead, placing the best interests of
the child above all else when considering whether to grant legal rec-
ognition to a child's relationship with a person who functions as his or
her parent.8 In so doing, courts should not preclude the adoption
solely on the basis of the sexual orientation of the person seeking to
adopt.'' Furthermore, when more than two people function as parents
to a child, society's laws ought not to limit a child to only two legally
recognized parents.") Such a limit may not advance the best interests
of a child."
Section I of this Note surveys the facts, statutory background and
courts' reasoning in cases from three states where the courts permitted
unmarried cohabitants to adopt a child.' 2 Section II applies the general
statutory scheme of the three states, and the "best interests of the
child" reasoning used in each of the cases, to argue that a child ought
not to be limited to only two legal parents.' 3
I. ALLOWING Two UNMARRIED COHABITANTS TO ADOPT A CHILD
Since June of 1993, the highest courts in three states and the
District of Columbia have allowed adoption of a child by unmarried
cohabitants.' 4 In the most recent case, the New York Court of Appeals
7 See In re Timmy, 619 N.E.2d at 318, 321; In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 399, 404, 405-06; In re
B.L,V.B., 628 A.2d at 1273, 1274, 1276.
8 See Bryant, supra note I, at 241.
See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & RECS. tit. 18, § 421.16(h) (2) (1988); In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d
at 317, 320; In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 398; In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d at 1276; Charlotte" Patterson,
Adoption of Minor Children by Lesbian and Gay Adults: A Social Science Perspective, 2 Dun: J. GEN.
L. & POCY 191, 191, 205 (1995). But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1985); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 170-B:4, 170-F:6 (1994).
ID See infra notes 161-207 and accompanying text for a discussion of why society ought not
to limit a child to two legally-recognrced parents when he or she has a parent-child relationship
with more.
II See infra notes 160-206 and accompanying text for a discussion of how limiting a child to
two parents may not be in that child's best interests.
12 See infra notes 14-134 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts, applicable
statutes, and courts' reasoning which allowed three states to permit adoption by unmarried
cohabitants.
"See infra notes 135-207 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the statutes and
potential best interests of the child allow more than two parents per child.
14 See In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 840 (D.C. 1995); In re Timmy, 619 N.E.2d at 315, 3111; In
re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 398; In re B.L.V.B,, 628 A.2d at 1272.
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on November 2, 1995 allowed a woman to adopt her partner's child,
and an unmarried man and woman together to adopt the woman's
biological child, without extinguishing the biological mother's paren-
tal rights and obligations in either instance.' 5 In September of 1993,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts allowed two women to-
gether to adopt the biological child of one of the women without
extinguishing the biological mother's parental rights and obligations. 16
Similarly, in June of 1993, the Supreme Court of Vermont allowed one
woman to adopt her partner's biological child without extinguishing
the mother's parental rights and obligations.'?
A. The Adoptions
Although each of these adoptions occurred in different states, the
governing laws are similar in salient details. 18
 In all of the states, adoption
is not a common-law creation but rather a creature of statute.' 9 Each
state's adoption statute indicates who may adopt, providing for adop-
tion by either an individual or a husband and wife together." Each
state's statute further provides that adoption extinguishes the parental
rights and obligations of the biological parent. 2 ' However, none of the
statutes specifically provide for adoption by two or more unmarried
people. 22
The purpose underlying all of the statutes is an attempt to embody
and protect the best interests of the child." Thus, the courts of New
York, Massachusetts and Vermont all faced the issue of whether two
unmarried individuals who were not both the biological parents of the
child could become the legal parents of the child, despite the lack of
a specific provision to that effect in the state's adoption statute. 24
15 See In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 398, 404.
1 °' In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 316, 321,
17 See In re B,L.VB., 628 A.2d at 1272, 1274, 1276.
1g See infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the similarities in the state
adoption statutes.
is
	 In re Timmy, 619 N.E.2d at 317; Davis v. McGraw, 92 N.E. 332, 332 (Mass. 1910); In re
Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 399; In re Eaton, 111 N.E.2d 431, 432 (N.Y. 1953); In re. B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d
at 1272-74.
2" See MASS. GEN. Laws ch. 210, § 1 (1994); N.Y. Dom, REL. LAw § 110 (McKinney 1988); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 431 (1989).
21 See MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 210, § 6; N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 117; W. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 448.
22 See MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 210, § 1; N.Y. Dust. REL. LAW § 110; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 431;
In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 322 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
25
 See In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 318; In reJacob, 660 N.E.2d at 399; In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d
at 1276 & n.5.
24 See MASS. GEN. Laws ch. 210, § 1; N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 110; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 431;
In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 315; In reJacob, 660 N.E.2d at 398; In re B.L.VB., 628 A.2d at 1272.
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I. Vermont: In re B.L.V.B. 2'
In 1993, the Supreme Court of Vermont, in In re B.L.VB., unan-
imously allowed one woman to adopt her partner's biological child
without extinguishing the mother's parental rights and obligations. 26
In Vermont, adoption is solely a creature of statute." Section 431 of
the Vermont adoption statute provides that a single adult, or a husband
and wife together, may adopt a child and requires that if an adult
seeking to adopt is married, the spouse must join in the adoption. 28
The statute also provides, in section 448, that the adoption terminates
the rights of the biological parent. 28 Section 448 further contains a
stepparent exception, allowing a biological parent to retain his or her
rights when his or her spouse adopts the child."
Because adoption in Vermont is a statutory creation, the court
examined the statute in order to decide whether to permit the adop-
tion.s' The court noted that the statute's primary objective is the promo-
don of children's welfare. 32 Thus, in applying the statutes, Vermont
courts seek to implement that purpose by looking not only at the words
of the statute but also at its reason and spirit to avoid results that are
irrational, unreasonable or absurd. 33
The petitioners in In re B.L.VB., Jane and Deborah, had lived
together in a committed relationship since 1986. 34 Together they de-
cided to have and rear children. 35 On two separate occasions, Jane gave
birth to a son after being impregnated with sperm from an anonymous
donor." Deborah assisted the midwife at both births, and had been
equally responsible for parenting the children since their births. 37
25 628 A.2d 1271.
2" Id. at 1272, 1276,
27 See id. at 1272-74.
28 W. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 431. Specifically, the statute provides that "[a] person or husband
and wife together ... may adopt any other person" and that "[a] married man or a married
woman shall not adopt a person or be adopted without the consent of the other spouse." Id.
29 Id. § 448.
51' Id. Specifically, the statute provides:
The natural parents of a minor shall he deprived, by the adoption, of all legal right
to control of such minor . . . [but] when the adoption is made by a spouse of a
natural parent, obligations ... and rights of ... the natural parent who has inter-
married with the adopting parent shall not be affected.
Id.
31 See In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d at 1272-74.
32 Id. at 1273 & n.l.
33 See id. at 1273.
34 Id. at 1272.
35 See id.
56 See In re B.L.VB., 628 A.2d at 1272.
"See id.
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Jane and Deborah filed uncontested adoption petitions seeking
legal recognition of their status as co-parents, asking the probate court
to allow Deborah to legally adopt the children while leaving Jane's
parental rights intact. 3" Both the Department of Social and Rehabilita-
tion Services and a separate psychologist determined that the adop-
dons were in the best interests of the children, and recommended that
the court allow the adoptions for the psychological and emotional
protection of the children. 3" The probate court nevertheless denied
the petition, holding that the Vermont adoption statute requires that
for a couple to adopt together, the couple must be married, and that
if the two are not married, the parental rights and obligations of the
biological parent terminate upon adoption.'"
The Vermont Supreme Court first examined the language of the
statute to determine whether Vermont law requires the termination of
a biological mother's parental rights if her children are adopted by a
person to whom she is not married.'" Noting that section 431 allows
an unmarried person to adopt, and that the only limitation on that
right is that if the person to be adopted is married, his or her spouse
must consent to the adoption, the court determined that only a restric-
tive reading of section 448, which severs the rights of the biological
parent upon adoption, would exclude Deborah from adopting the two
children. 42 Because the legislature adopted this provision in 1947, the
court determined that the legislature did not consider, and thus nei-
ther explicitly condemned nor condoned, adoption by unmarried cou-
ples.°
Thus, finding no specific guidance, the court turned to the legis-
lative purpose behind section 448. 44 After close examination of the
statute, the court concluded that the legislature intended to prevent a
biological parent's continued involvement from disrupting the family
unit formed by the adoption.'" The court noted that this intent would
not apply to the situation here, because both the biological mother
and the adoptive mother comprise the child's family unit.46
To avoid frustrating the purpose behind a statute, the court as-
serted, its interpretation must change as social mores change.° Thus,
" See id.
" See id.
441 See id.
41 See In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d at 1272.
42
 Id. at 1273.
45 Id. at 1273-74, 1273 n.2.
44 Id. at 1274.
45 Id.
46 See In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d at 1274.
47 Id. at 1275.
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the court refused to conclude that the legislature intended to termi-
nate the rights of a biological parent who would continue raising the
child, because such a conclusion would defeat adoptions otherwise in
the best interests of the children. 45 Hence, the court allowed adoptions
by same-sex, unmarried parents to fall within the provision in section
448, allowing a stepparent to adopt his or her spouse's child without
extinguishing the spouse's parental rights.49
Explicitly declining to approve or disapprove of Jane and Debo-
rah's relationship, and emphasizing that Deborah had acted as a par-
ent to the children from the moment they were born, the court allowed
the adoption." In so doing, the court asserted that denying the chil-
dren of same-sex unions a legal relationship with their de facto second
parents would, as a matter of law, violate the best interests of the
children and the purpose of the statute. 5 ' The Vermont Supreme Court
thus concluded that the statutory language did not prohibit the adop-
tions, that terminating the birth mother's rights would reach an absurd
result in these circumstances and that such a result was inconsistent
with the best interests of the children and the public policy of Ver-
mont. 52 Therefore, the court allowed Jane and Deborah to adopt Jane's
biological children whom they both parented from birth."
2. Massachusetts: In re Tammy"
In 1993, a divided Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ("SJC"),
in In re Tammy, allowed two unmarried cohabiting women, one of
whom was the biological mother of the child, to jointly adopt that
child.55 In Massachusetts, as in Vermont, the law of adoption is purely
statutory." Thus, the Massachusetts courts, in determining when to
allow an adoption, must examine the relevant statute's language and
purpose.57
Section 1 of chapter 210 of the Massachusetts General Laws pro-
vides that any adult may petition the probate court for permission to
adopt someone younger, unless the person to be adopted is the wife,
48 Id. at 1274.
43 See id. at 1276.
50 Id.
51 In re B.L.V.B, 628 A.2d at 1276 & n.5.
52 See id. at 1273, 1274, 1276.
53 See id. at 1273, 1276.
54 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993).
55 Id. at 315, 316. The court divided four to three on the decision. See id. at 315, 321.
1-'5 See id. at 317; Davis v. McGraw, 92 N.E. 332, 332 (Mass. 1910); In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d at
1272-74.
57 See In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 317-18.
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husband, brother, sister, uncle or aunt of the petitioner. 58 The statute
does not explicitly forbid or require anyone else to join the petition,
other than the prospective parent's spouse, if he or she is married.°
Section 6 of the statute does provide, however, for the termination of
the parental rights and obligations of the child's biological parent
upon entry of an adoption decree.° The legislative intent to promote
the best interests of the child is evidenced throughout the statute
governing adoptions. 6'
At the time of the case, Helen and Susan had lived together in a
committed relationship for more than ten years. 62 Like Deborah and
Jane in the Vermont case, Helen and Susan planned together to have
a child whom they would jointly parent.° After conceiving by artificial
insemination, Susan gave birth to Tammy. 64 Since Tammy's birth, both
Susan and Helen had equally reared her, providing her with what the
court determined to be a comfortable home and a warm, stable and
supportive environment.°
A wide variety of witnesses "testified to the fact that Helen and
Susan participate equally in raising Tammy, that Tammy relates to both
women as her parents, and that the three form a healthy, happy, and
stable family unit."66 Evidence also indicated that the adoption was
important for Tammy financially as well as emotionally. 67 In addition,
Helen and her living children and descendants, whether by blood or
adoption, are beneficiaries of three irrevocable family trusts. 66 An at-
torney appointed to represent Tammy's interests strongly recommended
that the court grant the joint petition. 69
Based on this evidence, a judge of the probate and family court
entered a decree allowing both Helen and Susan to adopt Tammy, after
determining that they functioned separately and together as the cus-
todial and psychological parents of Tammy and that it was in Tammy's
best interests for both to adopt her. 7° The judge asked that the appeals
court decide, however, whether such a decree was possible as a matter
68 MASS. GE N. LAws ch. 210, § 1 (1994).
See In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 318.
60 Chapter 210, § 6.
61 See In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 319.
62 See id. at 316.
63 See id.; In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1272 (Vt. 1993).
6'1 See In in Tammy, 619 N.E.2dat316.
66
 See id.
66 Id. at 317.
67 See id.
68 See id.
69 See In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 317.
70 See id. at 315-16.
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of law. 7 ' The SJC then transferred the case to itself on its own motion
to determine if anything in the law of the Commonwealth would
prevent this adoption. 72 Acknowledging that the legislature primarily
intended that the adoption statute advance the interests of the child,
the SJC first considered whether the statute permitted two unmarried
cohabitants to adopt. 75 The court then turned to the issue of whether
Susan's legal relationship with Tammy would have to terminate upon
Tammy's adoption. 74
In considering whether the statute permitted the joint adoption,
the SJC applied the "legislatively mandated rule of statutory construc-
tion that 'words importing the singular number may extend and be
applied to several persons" to determine that more than one person
may adopt a child. 75 The SJC noted that the legislature specifically
demarcated those adoptions which would be counter to public policy
in another section of the chapter and did not prohibit adoption by two
unmarried individuals. 76 Furthermore, the SJC indicated, the legisla-
ture used general language to define who may adopt and who may be
adopted so that the probate court could consider a variety of adoption
petitions which might be in the best interests of the child."
After determining that there was no specific statutory prohibition
against Susan and Helen's adoption of Tammy, the SJC considered
whether this adoption was in Tammy's best interest. 78 The court noted
that this adoption would result in a plethora of financial benefits to
Tammy.79 Perhaps more importantly, the SJC reasoned, the adoption
71 See id. at 316.
72 See id. at 316, 317.
73 See id. at 318.
74 See In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 321.
75 Id. at 319, 321. This maxim requires that one read section 1 of chapter 210 to permit:
[more than one] person of full age [to] petition the probate court of the county
in which [they] reside[] for leave to adopt as [their] child another person younger
than [themselves] unless such other person is [their] wife or husband, or brother,
sister, uncle or aunt, of the whole or half blood.
MASS. GEN. Laws ch. 210, § 1 (1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 4, § 6 (1994); See In re Tammy, 619
N.E.2d at 319.
76 1n re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 319. Chapter 210, section 1 of the Massachusetts General Laws
lists the "wife or husband, or brother, sister, uncle or aunt, of the whole or half blood" of the
adopter as those adoptions counter to public policy. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 1; see In re
Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 318, 319.
" Id. at 319.
See id. at 320.
79 /d. Specifically, the SJC determined that the adoption would:
entitle Tammy to inherit from Helen's family trusts and from Helen and her family
under the law of intestate succession, ... to receive support from Helen, who will
be legally obligated to provide such support, ... to be eligible for coverage under
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would allow Tammy to preserve her family relationship with Helen in
the event that Helen and Susan separate or Susan predeceases Helen. 80
In light of these factors, the SJC determined that the adoption would
be in Tammy's best interest. 8 '
The SJC next focused on whether Helen's adoption of Tammy
required extinguishing Susan's parental rights. 82
 Reasoning that the
section extinguishing the rights of the biological parent upon adoption
is directed to instances where the child is adopted away from its bio-
logical parents, the SJC indicated that the provision's purpose "is to
protect the security of the child's newly-created family unit by elimi-
nating involvement with the child's natural parents."" Thus, the SJC
concluded that the legislature did not intend for a biological parent's
legal relationship with his or her child to be terminated when the
biological parent is a party to the adoption petition. 84
 Therefore, the
SJC ultimately held that the probate court has jurisdiction to enter a
decree on a joint adoption petition brought by two petitioners, and
that when a biological parent is a party to the joint adoption petition,
that parent's legal relationship to the child does not terminate upon
entry of the adoption decree. 85
 This holding allowed Helen and Susan
to adopt Tammy under Massachusetts law without extinguishing Susan's
parental rights and obligations.86
Unlike the majority, which focused on the fact that the statute did
not expressly forbid the adoption, the three dissenting justices would
have denied the petition because the statute does not expressly permit
the adoption.s1
 They noted that "[t] here is . . . nothing in the statute
indicating a legislative intent to allow two or more unmarried persons
jointly to petition for adoption," and interpreted the statute narrowly
because adoption is a creature of the legislature. 88
 The dissenting
justices indicated that unless one of the potential petitioners spe-
cifically enumerated in the statute brings the adoption petition, then
Helen's health insurance policies, and to be eligible for social security benefits in
the event of Helen's disability or death.
Id.
8° Id.
8L
 In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 321.
82 See id.
" Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
"See In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 321.
87 See id. at 318 (majority), 322-23 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
88
 Id. at 322,322-23 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
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the court should lack jurisdiction to entertain the petition." Because
the only time the statute contemplates a second petitioner is where the
initial petitioner has a living, competent spouse, the dissent would have
held that the statute did not permit Helen and Susan's joint petition
for adoption of Tammy, but would have allowed Helen to petition
alone to adopt Tammy with Susan's consent and would further have
permitted Susan to retain all her parental rights and obligations."
Thus, two slightly different approaches to parallel situations
emerged." The Vermont court allowed one partner to adopt the other's
child without extinguishing the first parent's parental rights and obli-
gations." In contrast, the Massachusetts court allowed both partners
together to adopt the child of one of them without extinguishing the
first parent's rights and obligations. 93
3. New York: In re jacob94
In 1995, the Court of Appeals of New York, in In re Jacob, allowed
adoptions in two separate cases it joined together: one in which one
partner sought to adopt the other's child without extinguishing the
parental rights of the first parent; and one in which both partners
together sought to adopt the child of one of them without extinguishing
the first parent's parental rights." The court held that New York's
adoption statute both permitted the petitioner in each case to adopt,
and did not require termination of the biological parent's rights in
either case. 95 Section 110 of the Domestic Relations Law, New York's
adoption statute, provides that an "adult unmarried person or an adult
husband and his adult wife together may adopt another person." 97 The
Domestic Relations Law further provides that the biological parent's
rights and obligations terminate upon the adoption." In New York,
" Id. at 323 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
99 Id. at 322 (Lynch, J., dissenting). This result, though not supported by reasoning in the
dissenting opinion, would likely have been reached by the SJC in an analysis of the Massachusetts
laws similar to that performed by the Vermont court nearly two years earlier. See id. (Lynch, J.,
dissenting); In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1273-76 (Vt. 1993).
91 See In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 321; In re B.L.VB., 628 A.2d at 1273-76.
92 /n re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d at 1272, 1276.
95 1n re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 321.
94 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995).
95 1d. at 398.
99 1d.
97 N.Y. Dom REI.. LAW § 110 (McKinney 1988).
98 Id, Specifically, the statute states that "after the making of an order of adoption the natural
parents shall be relieved of all parental duties toward and of all responsibilities for and shall have
no rights over such adoptive child or to his property by descent or succession." Id.
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neither marital status nor sexual orientation may alone be determina-
tive in an adoption proceeding. 99
In one of the two joined cases, Jacob's mother and his biological
father had separated before Jacob's birth."° When the child was one
year old, his mother, Roseanne MA., began living with Stephen T.K.'°'
Three years later, Stephen and Roseanne filed a joint petition to adopt
Jacob.'" In the other case, G.M. and P.I., two women, had lived to-
gether in a close relationship for nineteen years.'" In 1989 the two
women decided that P.I. would have a child they would rear together,
and after artificial insemination by an anonymous donor, P.I. gave birth
to Dana in 1990.' 94 Since then, G.M. and PI have shared parenting
responsibilities."' In April of 1993, G.M. filed a petition to adopt Dana,
to which P.I. consented."6
The family court which first considered Jacob's adoption acknow-
ledged that granting the adoption would be good for Jacob, yet dis-
missed the petition because the adoption statute did not authorize
adoptions by an unmarried couple."7 The Appellate Division affirmed,
although two justices dissented.'" In the other adoption proceeding,
a disinterested investigator's report had recommended that G.M. be
permitted to adopt Dana and indicated that G.M. and P.I. provided
her with a "family structure in which to grow and flourish." Even so,
the family court denied the petition, holding that the statute did not
grant the petitioners the power to adopt, and further held that the
adoption statute prohibited the adoption by requiring the termination
of P.I.'s relationship with Dana upon adoption by G.M."° The Appellate
Division concluded that G.M. had statutory permission to adopt, but
affirmed that the provision extinguishing the biological parent's rights
and obligations prohibited the adoption.'"
The Court of Appeals of New York began its analysis by acknow-
ledging that adoption in New York is solely the creature of statute, and
99 See N.Y. Cost. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 421.16(h)(2) (1988).
11)0 See In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 398.
101 See id.
102 See id.
los See id.
104 see id.
1U5 See In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 398.
106 See id.
107 See id,
08 See id.
109 See id.
11° See In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 398.
"' See id.
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thus the court must strictly construe the adoption statute."' The court
went on to indicate that the requirement of strict construction applies
equally to legislative purpose and statutory language)' Thus, the court
indicated "that in strictly construing the adoption statute, [the court's]
primary loyalty must be to the statute's legislative purpose—the child's
best interest."'"
The court found that allowing the two adults who function as a
child's parents to become the child's legal parents would advance the
policy of protecting the child's best interests." 5 The benefits of such a
recognition, the court continued, would include the right of the child
to receive social security and life insurance benefits from both parents,
the right to sue for the wrongful death of either parent, the right to
inherit from both parents under the laws of intestacy and eligibility for
coverage under both parents' health insurance policies." 5 The court
went on to emphasize that in addition to these financial benefits, the
child would also gain the emotional security of knowing that if any-
thing should happen to the biological parent, the other parent would
have presumptive custody, enabling the child's relationship with ex-
tended family members to continue." 7 Having concluded that the
proposed adoptions thus satisfied the purpose of the adoption statute,
the court turned its attention to whether the adoptions also comported
with the language of the statute." 8
The court began by emphasizing that the patchwork nature of
New York's current adoption statute, caused by innumerable amend-
ments, made it difficult to discern with precision any specific legislative
intent." 5 The court then turned to the particular statutory provisions
at issue.' 2° Reasoning that section 110, entitled "Who May Adopt,"
explicitly permits an adult unmarried person to adopt, the court con-
cluded that both petitioners, as adult unmarried persons, had permis-
sion to adopt.''' Turning then to the issue of whether the phrase "or
an adult husband and his adult wife together" in section 110 of the
statute requires that only married people may adopt a child together,
the court asserted that the statute requires only that if a married person
seeks to adopt, his or her spouse must join in the adoption, rather than
"2 Id. at 399.
" 3 Id.
H4 m.
115 See In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 399.
116 /d.
117
 See id.
119 See id. at 400.
119 See id.
12"
	 In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 400.
121 Id.
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that only married couples may adopt together.' 22
 The court concluded
that amendments to the adoption statute indicate a legislative intent
to broaden the field of potential adoptive parents, regardless of their
marital status or sexual orientation.'"
Having concluded that section HO did not preclude the adop-
tions, the court examined whether section 117, which extinguishes the
rights of the biological parent upon adoption of his or her child,
required termination of Jacob and Dana's biological mothers' rights. 124
Noting that the legislature which codified section 117 in 1938 probably
did not contemplate families with same-sex parents, the court asserted
that the legislature designed section 117 "as a shield to protect new
adoptive families," and not "as a sword to prohibit otherwise beneficial
intrafamily adoptions by second parents."'"
First, the court indicated, section 117 speaks primarily of estate
law, so it appears that the legislative intent is to clarify the resolution
of property disputes upon the death of an adoptive parent or child,
rather than to control the granting of the adoption in the first place.'"
Second, the court examined recent amendments to other sections of
the adoption laws, which allow the biological parent to remain involved
in the child's life even after the adoption.' 27 The court reasoned that
these provisions imply legislative acceptance of biological parents on-
going role in their children's lives, even after an adoption.' 28 Based on
this reasoning, the court concluded that section 117 does not require
termination of the biological parent's rights when the biological parent
has consented to the adoption and will continue to rear the child
together with the second parent.' 29
 Thus, having determined that the
adoptions would generally be in the best interests of the children, that
section 110 granted permission to adopt to the petitioners, and that
section 117 did not require termination of the rights and obligations
of the biological parents, the court reinstated the adoption provisions
and remitted the cases to the family court for further proceedings.' 8"
122 Id.
128 See id. at 400-01.
124 See id. at 401.
125 In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 405.
125 1d. at 402.
127 Id. at 403-04. Section 117(1) (d) of the domestic relations law allows a stepparent to adopt
a child with consent of the biological parent, without extinguishing the biological parent's rights
and responsibilities. N.Y. Dow. REL. Law § 117(1)(d) (McKinney 1988). Further, social services
law section 383-c allows the parties to an adoption to agree to different terms as to the nature of
the biological parents' post-adoptive relationship with the child, expressly permitting the biologi-
cal parent to retain certain rights. N,Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 383-c(3)(b) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1996).
128 See In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 404.
129 1d.
180 Id. at 399-400, 401, 404, 406.
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Three dissenting justices did not agree with the majority's inter-
pretation of the statute, and would have held that the petitioners
lacked statutory permission to adopt and that the rights and obliga-
tions of the biological mother terminated upon adoption."' The dis-
sent wondered whether, under the majority's reasoning and holding,
there would be any limit to how many people could join together to
adopt a child."2
 It also expressed concern that the majority's interpre-
tation of the adoption statute constituted judicial overstepping into the
legislative arena."3 Because of these concerns, and a stricter reading
of the adoption statutes, the dissent would have denied the petitions
to adopt.' 34
II. WHY WE SHOULD NOT LIMIT A CHILD TO Two PARENTS
A. Established Precedent and Policy Support Multiple-Parent Adoptions
The majority opinions in all of the cases discussed above address
three main issues: (1) whether the petitioners have power to adopt
under a "who can adopt" provision of the state statute; (2) whether the
biological parents' rights and obligations must terminate upon the
adoption; and (3) whether the adoption will effectuate the best inter-
ests of the child.'" I suggest that, under the logic of these cases,
nothing in any of the state statutes denies permission for more than
two petitioners simultaneously to adopt a child; that nothing in any of
the state statutes requires termination of the biological parent's rights
upon such an adoption, if the biological parent intends to continue
raising the child; and that such an adoption may be in the best interests
of a child.'" Thus, allowing three or more parents to adopt the same
child flows logically from the reasoning of these three decisions.'"
1. Statutory Scheme, Generally
Because I propose a situation which the courts of Vermont, Mas-
sachusetts and New York have not yet addressed, I will discuss the
applicable law as though it were an amalgamation of the statutory law
131 Id. at 408, 410 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
182 /d. at 408 (Bellaeosa, J., dissenting).
133 See In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 414-15 (13eilacosa, J., dissenting).
134 Id. at 415 (Bellacusa, J., dissenting).
135 See In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 318, 321 (Mass. 1993); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 399,
400, 401; In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1273 (Vt. 1993).
136 See In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 318, 321; In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 399, 400, 401; In re
B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d at 1273.
137 See In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 318, 321; In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 399, 400, 401; In re
B.L.VB., 628 A.2d at 1273.
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in all three states. Thus, my generic statute contains those provisions
that are common to the adoption statutes of the three states, spe-
cifically, a provision naming who can adopt and indicating that "a
person or a husband and wife together" may do so, and a provision
indicating that upon adoption, the parental rights and obligations of
the biological parents terminate.'" Additionally, in this generic state,
adoption is a creation of the legislature and of statute and, as in
Vermont, Massachusetts and New York, consideration of the child's
best interests motivates the adoption statute.'"
2. Statutory Permission to Adopt
Under the reasoning of the three cases, three or more people
would have statutory permission to adopt the same child."° In each
case, the court allowed an adoption in part on the grounds that it. was
not specifically prohibited by statute."' The situation I propose is
similarly not prohibited by statute." 2
In Vermont, the court determined that a provision that "[a] per-
son or husband and wife together" may adopt did not deny one woman
the right to adopt her partner's biological child, in part because the
statutory language did not prohibit such adoptions."' In allowing two
women to join together to adopt a child, the Massachusetts SJC focused
on the fact that the statute neither expressly prohibits joinder by any
person to an adoption petition nor prohibits adoption by two unmar-
ried individuals.'" The New York Court of Appeals also focused on the
fact that the statute did not preclude an unmarried person in a rela-
tionship with another unmarried person from adopting. 15 The com-
mon logic to the reasoning of the three courts is that the statute does
not specifically prohibit the proposed adoption." 6
 In the same way,
138
 See ntss. GEN. Laws ch. 210, §§ 1, 6 (1994); N.Y. DOM. Rm., 1.4w §§ 110, 117 (McKinney
1988); VT. STAT. ANN. lit. 15, §§ 431, 448 (1989).
"g
 See In re 'lizmmy, 619 N.E.2d at 317, 319; In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d ;it 399; In re B.L.V.11., 628
A.2d at 1273 & n.1, 1272-74.
14° See In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 318-19; In re Jacob, 660 N,E.2d at 400-01; In re B. L.VB.,
628 A.2d at 1273.
141
 See In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 318; In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 398-99; In -re B.L.VB., 628
A.2d at 1273.
192
 See In n? Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 318; In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 398-99; In re B.LVB., 628
A.2d at 1273. Sec supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text for discussion of statutory scheme.
145 See In re B. L.VB., 628 A.2d at 1272-73, 1273-74.
144 See In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 318 & u.3, 321.
145 See In re jacnb, 660 N.E.2d at 400-01.
146 See In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 318; In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 398-99; In re B.L.VB., 628
A.2d at 1273.
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none of the statutes prohibit adoption of a child by more than two
people.' 47
For example, if a child's parents divorce and one remarries, the
stepparent could adopt the child, the remarried parent and the step-
parent could adopt the child, or the stepparent, the remarried parent
and the single parent could adopt the child.'" Furthermore, if the
single parent also remarried, there is no reason why the second step-
parent could not also adopt, either alone or in combination with any
of the other parents, provided the court found the adoption to be in
the best interests of the child.'" Much attention is given in each of the
above cases to the role the second parent plays in raising the child.'"
If everyone petitioning to adopt the child functions as a parent to the
child, then the reasoning of the Vermont, Massachusetts and New York
courts grants each functional parent statutory permission to adopt.' 5 '
3. Termination of Biological Parents' Rights
Because the courts did not terminate the biological parent's rights
and obligations in a second-parent adoption when the biological par-
ent remained involved in the life of the child, third-parent (or fourth-par-
ent) adoptions need not terminate the parental rights and responsibilities
of the already recognized parents.'" The Vermont court concluded
that the policy behind the termination provision was to protect the
security of family units, and that to enforce the provision where the
biological mother intended to take part in raising the child would
reach an absurd result.'" In Massachusetts, the court reached a similar
conclusion by indicating that the termination provision attempts to
protect the security of the child's newly created family unit, rather then
to sever the relationship between a biological parent and his or her
child when the parent is a party to the adoption petition.' 54 Similarly,
in New York, the court concluded that the termination provision exists
147 See In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 318-19; In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 400-01; In re B.L.VB.,
628 A.2d at 1273.
148 See supra notes 140-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of statutory permission
to adopt.
"9 Id.
15° See In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 316; In repeat), 660 N.E.2d at 398; In re B.L.VB., 628 A.2d
at 1272.
151 See In re Tammy, 619 N,E.2d at 316, 318-19; In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 398, 400-01; In re
B.L.VB., 628 A.2d at 1272, 1273.
152 See In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 321; In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 404; In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d
at 1274.
155 Sre In re B.L.VB., 628 A.2d at 1274.
159 See In re Timmy, 619 N.E.2d at 321.
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as a shield to protect new adoptive families and need not apply where
the biological parent either consents to or joins in the adoption, agrees
to retain parental rights and intends to continue raising the child.' 55
Under this reasoning, if the biological parent of a child were to
continue raising the child along with his or her stepparent, then the
termination provision of the generic statute need not extinguish the
parental rights and responsibilities of the biological parent.'" This is
especially true if the legislature of my generic state, as in Vermont,
Massachusetts and New York, intended the termination provision to
protect the sanctity of the adoptive family from intrusion by a biologi-
cal parent who is not a part of that family.'" Thus, neither the "who
may adopt" provision nor the termination provision of my generalized
statute prohibits adoption of a child by three or more people who all
function as the parents of that child, or requires termination of the
rights of a biological parent who remains involved in the upbringing
of the child.'" Therefore, a child's divorced parents and his or her two
stepparents could all become the legal parents of the child.' 59
To take the example only a bit further, imagine that rather than
two women seeking judicial acknowledgment of both of their relation-
ships with the child of one of them, that two men seek the same judicial
recognition. From there, one can imagine the dissolution of the rela-
tionship between the two men, and the introduction of a stepfather
into the child's life. Just as two biological parents and a stepparent
could become the legal parents of a child, so could the two adoptive
parents and the stepparent.' 5° Thus, a judicially recognized family could
consist of three men and a baby.
B. The Best Interests of the Child?: Counter
-
Arguments Considered
Allowing a child to have three parents may seem a bit absurd—af-
ter all, it is not biologically possible for a child to have more than two
parents. Is it really in the best interests of the child to have more than
155 See In rejacob, 660 N.E,2t1 at 404,405.
155 See In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 321; In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 404, 405; In re ALVA., 628
A.2d at 1274. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text for hypothetical statutory scheme.
157
 See In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 521; In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 405; In re B. L. V. 628 A.2d
at 1274.
158 See supra notes 138-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the reasoning of
the cases and my generalized statute allow adoption by three or more people without terminating
the biological parent's rights.
159 See id.
16°See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of adoption by two
biological parents and a stepparent.
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two parents, or are three or more parents detrimental to a child? The
two parent nuclear family is the time-honored, tried and tested, best
way to rear a child, is it not?
In many instances, it will be in the best interests of the child to
grant legal recognition to the child's relationships with more than two
parents.''' The three cases discussed in this Note advance several argu-
ments for allowing legal recognition of a second parent that apply
equally to allowing legal recognition of a third or fourth parent.' 62 The
Vermont court, in considering the best interests of the child, focused
on the benefits and security of a legal relationship with someone who
functions as a parent to the child.' 63 The Massachusetts court noted
the ability of the child to inherit under laws of intestacy, to receive
support from both women who would both be legally obligated to
provide such support, to be eligible for coverage under both women's
social security benefits and health benefits, as well as the fact that the
child perceived both women as her parents and that her relationship
with each should be preserved in the event of the termination of their
relationship to one another. 164 Similarly, in New York, the court focused
on the child's right to receive social security and life insurance benefits,
the right to sue for the wrongful death of a parent, the right to inherit
under the laws of intestacy, eligibility for coverage under his or her
parents' health insurance policies and the benefit of preserving the
child's relationship with the adoptive parent in the event of the disso-
lution of the parents' relationship with each other or the death of one
parent. 165
The benefits which accrue to a child upon adoption by more than
two people include both the pecuniary and the emotional.' 66 The child
will become eligible for coverage under all parents' insurance policies,
allowing the family to choose the best policy and protecting the child
from loss of insurance should one or more parent(s) become unem-
ployed.'" "In addition, ... a [third] parent adoption enables the child
161 See infra notes 162-207 and accompanying text for a discussion of how granting legal
recognition to more than two parent-child relationships could be in a child's best interest.] want
to emphasize from the outset that it may be in a child's best interest to have more than two legally
recognized parents. I do not claim that this will be in the best interests of all children, everywhere.
162 See In re Tammy, 619 A.2d at 320; In reJacob, 660 N.E..2d at 399; In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d
at 1276.
163 See In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d at 1276.
164 See In re Tammy, 619 A.2d at 316, 320.
165 See In reJacob, 660 N.E.2d at 399.
166 See infra notes 167-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of benefits accruing to a
child upon adoption by more than two people.
167 See Bryant, supra note 1, at 241 (citing Chancellor v. Chancellor, 23 S.W.2d 761, 763-65
(Tex. Ct. App. 1929) (holding that the term "child" in insurance policy includes adopted children)).
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to inherit from [all] parents through the law of intestate succession."'"
The pecuniary interests mentioned by the Massachusetts and New York
courts when considering second-parent adoptions apply similarly to
consideration of third-parent adoptions. 169
 The rights to social security
and life insurance benefits, to inherit under the laws of intestacy, to
sue for the wrongful death of a parent, to be covered by a parent's
health insurance policy and to have a parent obligated to provide
support for a child do not diminish in economic value when tripled
or quadrupled (for three or four parents) as opposed to when doubled
(for two parents).' 7"
Despite the fact that courts may limit children to two legal parents,
legal rules do not constrain the realities of many children's lives.' 7 '
Children form strong bonds with their daily caregivers, whether bio-
logically related or not.'" What matters to children are the day-to-day
interactions with the adults who take care of them and thus become
their parent figures)" Children often form attachments to adults out-
side the nuclear family.'" When parents create a nontraditional family,
that family becomes the reality of the child's life.'" Furthermore, al-
though experts are divided on much about rearing children, "[n]ear
consensus . . exist[s] . . . for the principle that a child's healthy
growth depends in large part upon the continuity of his personal
relationships."'" Thus, where a child has bonded with more than two
168 Bryant, supra note 1, at 240.
169 See In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 320; In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 399.
1 " See in re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 320; In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 399.
Ill
	 Bartlett, supra note 1, at 881-82; Polikoff, supra note 1, at 473. The legal doctrine of
equitable adoption recognizes this Fact by permitting a child to inherit from a person who was
not the child's legal parent when that person had demonstrated an intent to adopt the child. See
JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 100-08 (5th ed. 1995);
Polikoff, supra note 1, at 473 n.52.
172 See Bryant, supra note 1, at 239 n.37.
173 See id, (citing josEpi I GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 12-13
(1973)).
171
 See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 882.
175 See Polikoff, supra note 1, at 473,483.
176 Bartlett, supra note 1, at 902 (citing M. AINSWORTH, THE EFFECTS OF MATERNAL DEPRI-
VATION: A REVIEW OF FINDINGS AND CONTROVERSY IN THE CONTEXT OF RESEARCH STRATEGY IN
DEPRIVATION OF MATERNAL CARE: A REASSESSMENT OF ITS EFFECTS 97,143 (1962); E. ERIKSON,
IDENTITY AND 'DIE LIFE CYCLE 122
-31 (1980); J. GOLDSTEIN ET AL, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD 8-9,31 -33 (1979); Lawn, An Ecological Approach to Child Welfare: Issues of Family
Identity and Continuity, in SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE: PEOPLE AND ENV/ KONMENTS 174 (1979); M.
PRINGLE, THE NEEDS OF CHILDREN 34-39 (1974); Colon, Family Ties and Child Placement, 17 FAM.
PROCESS 289 (1978); Finkelstein, Children in Limbo, 25 Soc. Woux 100 (1980); Kelly & Waller-
stein, The Effects of Parental Divorce: Experiences of the Child in Early Latency, 46 AM. J. ORTHOP-
SYCHIATRY 20 (1976)).
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parents, the law ought to recognize these bonds in order to promote
the emotional well-being of the child.'"
1. Perhaps Allowing a Child to Have More Than Two Parents Might
Subject the Child to Peer Ridicule for Being "Different"
Ridicule for being "different" might so impact a child with more
than two parents that allowing the adoption is not in his or her best
interests per se. 178 This argument shares a common basis with that
which holds that children of homosexual or lesbian parents suffer a
stigmatic hartn.'?° In fact, studies have shown that children of lesbians
or gay men do not suffer from growing up outside the mainstream.'"
Furthermore, peer teasing, taunting and ostracism ought not to
provide a legal basis for denying an adoption petition, since it is not
the role of any court to give effect to private bias and social prejudice.' 8 '
While acknowledging that issues surrounding prejudice and discrimi-
nation are very real for young people growing up in nontraditional
families, one must remember that children in many families need to
cope with differences due to race, ethnicity or socioeconomic class,
which may not be the overriding concerns that adults sometimes imag-
ine.'" Although I have not found any surveys to this effect, my own
informal collection of anecdotal reports indicates that almost everyone
receives incessant teasing about something as a child. 18 "
177 See. Bartlett, supra note I, at 944; Polikoff, supra note 1, at 483.
178 See Marianne T. O'Toole, Gay Parenting.' Myths and Realities, 9 PACE L. REV, 129, i46
(1989).
179 See id.
18° See In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 317 (Mass. 1993); In re Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1001-02
n.1 (Surr. 1992) (citing Patterson, infra, at 1033); Bryant, supra note 1, at 239 & n.39 (citing In
re "M.G., 632 A.2d 550, 553-54 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993) (quoting Charlotte J. Patterson,
Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents, 63 CHILD DEV. 1025, 1031-32 (1992)); Julia Frost Davies,
Note, Two Moms and a Baby: Protecting the Nontraditional Family Through Second Parent Adoptions,
29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1055, 1055 & n.5 (1995) (citing APRIL. MARTIN, PH.D., THE LESBIAN AND
GAY PARENTING HANDBOOK 204-10 (1993); CHERI PIES, CONSIDERING PARENTHOOD: A WORK-
BOOK FOR LESBIANS 77-93 (1993); RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND RF;ASON 417-19 (1992)).
181 See O'Toole, supra note 178, at 146.
182 See Patterson, supra note 9, at 200. Often, things are more simple from a child's perspec-
tive than an adult's. See id. One lesbian mother described the experience of telephoning the
parents of her daughter Emily's school friend. See id. (citing MARTIN, supra note 180, at 326).
The child who answered passed the phone to her mother, explaining "It's Emily's mom. Well, it's
one of them—she's got two." See id. (citing MARTIN, supra note 180, at 326). Another child, whose
teacher asked who the other man who lived at the child's house was, answered simply "that's my
father's husband." See id. (citing Jane Gross, New Challenges of Youth: Growing up in Gay Home,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1991, at Al).
183 1 received ribbing about my last name ("Rover" rapidly became "Bow-Wow" for many of
my classmates); others 1 know experienced such lovely comments as "what are all those spots on
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2. Most Children Live in Traditional Nuclear Families and Have No
Need for Legal Recognition of More than Two Parents
Maybe courts need not recognize more than two parents, because
most children live in nuclear families and have only two parents.' 84 In
fact, many children live in extended and nontraditional families.'" As
the United States Supreme Court acknowledged:
[o] urs is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the
bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family. . . . Even if
conditions of modern society have brought about a decline
in extended family households, they have not erased the
accumulated wisdom of civilization, gained over the centuries
and honored throughout our history, that supports a larger
conception of the family.' 86
Not only does our culture contain instances of children raised by
more than two people, some other cultures allow an even more
extended definition of family.'" For example, in Polynesia, parent-
ing is a collective task; the language generalizes the words for mother,
father and grandparent to all relatives of equivalent age and gender,
children have several houses that they regard as home and parental
rights are not exclusive of those of other adults.'"
3. Permitting Adoptions by More than Two Parents Might.
Contribute to Ongoing Disintegration of the Nuclear Family
These adoptions would not lead to the downfall of the nuclear
family in the United States, in part because the nuclear family does
your face?" (asked of a girl who had freckles) and the standard taunts of "crybaby," "lour-eyes,"
"metal-mouth," "fatso," "stupid" and "ugly," to name just a few.
184 See Howard V. Hayghe, Family Members in the Work Force, 113 MONTHLY Lnn. REV, 14, 16
(1990).
186 See id.; Davies, supra note 180, at 1066; see also Bartlett, supra note 1, at 880-81 (stating
that 25% of children did not live with two natural parents in 1982 and predicting an increase to
40% by 1990); James R. Wetzel, American Families: 75 Years of Change, 113 MONTHLY LAB. REV.
4, 4 (1990) (indicating that fewer families currently live in a married, two-parent family arrange-
ment).
186 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504-05 (1977).
187 See Polikoff, supra note 1, at 474 (discussing child rearing in Polynesia); Linda F. Smith,
Adoption—The Case for More Options, 1986 UTAH L. Rev. 495, 540-43 (discussing anthropological
evidence from Polynesia, Eskimo culture, the West Indies, Ghana, British Honduras and Native
American culture for proposition that other cultures approach child rearing differently).
1" See Polikoff, supra note I, at 474 (citing Ritchie, Polynesian Child Rearing: An Alternative
Model, 5 ALTERNATIVE LIFESTYLES: CHANGING PATTERNS IN MARRIAGE, PAM. & INTIMACY 125,
130 (1983)).
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not constitute the reality of many children's lives already.'" Historian
Stephanie Coontz argues that "families have always been in flux and
often in crisis; they have never lived up to the nostalgic notion about
the way things used to be."'" There are many versions of "family":
single parents raising children; children traveling between two homes;
children living with stepparents; grandparents, aunts, uncles and sib-
lings caring for children; heterosexual, unmarried cohabitants rearing
children together; and families with two parents of the same gender. 191
Today, fewer Americans are living in traditional nuclear families
than earlier in the twentieth century. 192
 By 1988, the traditional family
unit accounted for only about one-fifth of total families, compared with
more than three-fifths in 1940. 193
 The percentage of children living in
never-married single parent households more than quintupled be-
tween 1970 and 1982. 194
 In 1985, there were 6.8 million children living
in stepfamilies. 195
 Thus, large numbers of children already live outside
traditional nuclear families.
Strict adherence to the structure of nuclear families may not be
best for children and parents in industrial societies. 196 One commen-
tator has argued that the nuclear family cannot provide adequate
health, education and welfare for the young and the old so effectively
as an extended family.'" The parent-child relationship of nuclear lami-
189 See Hayghe, supra note 184, at 16.
19°Linda Eisaguirre, The Model Family that Never Was, ROCKY MTN. NEws, March 12, 1995,
at 87A (Citing STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE
NOSTALGIA TRAP (1992)).
393 See Davies, supra note 180, at 1066; see also Bartlett, supra note 1, at 880-81 (stating that
25% of children did nut live with two natural parents in 1982 and predicting an increase to 40%
by 1990); Wetzel, supra note 185, at 4 (indicating that fewer families currently live in a married,
two-parent family arrangement).
192 See Wetzel, supra note 185, at 4. Wetzel states: "The past 75 years brought momentous
changes in family life patterns of Americans as we adapted to dynamic economic, social, and
demographic developments." Id. at 12.
199 See Hayghe, supra note 184, at 16.
194 See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 991 11.9 (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SPECIAL STUDIES SERIES P-20, No. 380, MARITAL
STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MAR, 1982 5, Table E (1983)(percentage of children under
the age of 18 living in never-married single parent households increased from 0.8% in 1970 to
4.4% in 1982)).
199 See Polikoff, supra note 1, at 476 (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEFT OF COMMERCE,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SPECIAL. STUDIES SERIES P-23, No. 162, STUDIES IN MARRIAGE
AND THE FAMILY: JUNE 1989 29 (1990).
1116 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 510 n.7 (1977) (Brennan,J., concurring)
(citing BETTY YORRURG, THE CHANGING FAMILY 194 (1973)).
197 ,See id. (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing BETTY YORBURG, THE CHANGING FAMILY 194
(1973)).
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lies can become unbearably intense and exhausting if unrelieved.'"
Thus, the media, celebrities and community groups increasingly assert
that "it takes a whole village to raise a child."
For the law to stagnate while society evolves may harm those
children already living in nontraditional situations." Additionally, such
noted legal minds as Chief Justice Oliver Holmes and Justice Harry
Blackmun have argued that
it is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than
that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past. 20 '
4. Recognizing Multiple Parent-Child Relationships Might Lead to
Complicated Custody Disputes if the Parental Relationships
Dissolve
Recognizing multiple parent-child relationships might complicate
custody disputes so much that courts ought never to acknowledge
more than two parents of any one child." Denying recognition to
multiple-parent relationships would not prevent such confusion—it
already exists." Custody disputes frequently involve more than two
people. 204
 At least one court has already ordered a three-way custody
and visitation arrangement. 2u5
 Furthermore, various courts and corn-
198
 See id. (Brennan,	 concurring) (citing BETTY YORBURG, THE CHANGING FAMILY 194
(1973)); Eisaguirre, supra note 190, at 87A. The May 1995 issue of Psychology Today includes a
list titled "21 Tricks for Taming Children," which recommends that parents "share [their] baby
with other parents, grandparents, aunts, and uncles. Never try to do it alone; you will exhaust
one another with your needs. As the old African proverb says, 'It. takes a whole village to raise a
child.'" Frank Pittman, How to Manage Your Kids, 28 PSYCHOL, TODAY 42 (May, 1995).
199 See, e.g., HILLARY RODILAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE AND OTHER LESSONS CHILDREN
TEACH Us (1995); Eisaguirre, supra note 190, at 87A; Susan Ireland, Biggest Problem Educators
Face is Abandonment of Children, THE MORNING CALL (ALLENTOWN, PA), Mar. 17, 1995, at A17;
Navigating the Real World, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1995, at B2.
2® See In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1276 (Vt. 1993),
2°1 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, j., dissenting) (quoting Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)).
2112 See Kristine L. Burks, Redefining Parenthood: Child Custody and Visitation When Nontradi-
tional Families Dissolve, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 223, 225 (1994).
mSee infra notes 204-07 and accompanying text for a discussion of the already existing
confusion in custody battles.
2°4
 See Chaffin v. Frye, 119 Cal, Rptr. 22, 22, 26 (Ct, App. 1975) (maternal grandparents
granted custody); Roberts v. Roberts, 212 S.E,2d 410, 413 (N.C. Ct. App. .1975) (maternal great-aunt
and great-uncle granted custody).
299
 See Polikoff, supra note 1, at 470 n.35.
In a ruling deemed "highly unusual," a Chicago judge issued an order by agreement
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mentators have attempted to develop doctrines to apply to situations
where a child who is the subject of a custody dispute has bonded with
an adult who is not a legally recognized parent of that child.206 Perhaps,
then, granting legal recognition to these relationships, in the form of
allowing an adoption before the dissolution of the parents' relationships
to one another, would actually simplify some custody disputes by clari-
fying for the court whether a particular adult had a parental relation-
ship with the child. 207
III. CONCLUSION
The Vermont, Massachusetts and New York courts allowed second
parents to adopt their children.208 The courts accomplished this by
looking past the strict language of their states' adoption statutes to the
legislative intent underlying those statutes, and by examining the best
interests of the children. 208 The same reasoning suggests that courts
should allow third parents to adopt their children. 21 ° The state adop-
tion statutes neither forbid such adoption nor require termination of
already extant parent-child relationships. 2 " Rather, the s tatutes seek to
of all parties, awarding custody of a five-year-old girl to her mother, her mother's
ex-husband (whom the girl knew as her father), and the girl's biological father. The
girl will live with her mother and will visit her two fathers on weekends and in the
summer.
Id. (citing Wagner v. Erber, No. 85-D-6382 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook ay., Sept. 29,1987)).
206 See Bartlett, supra note I, at 944-51. The California Supreme Court has suggested that
visitation should be granted to a de facto parent which it describes as that person who, on a
day-to-day basis, assumes the role of parent, seeking to fulfill both the child's physical and
psychological needs for affection and care.' See Burks, supra note 202, at 24-45. Katherine
Bartlett developed a test for a "psychological parent" that redefines parenthood into a non-ex-
clusive status and permits awards of custody and visitation based upon the child's best interests.
See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 944-51. Nancy Polikoff proposes expanding the definition of
parenthood employed in custody and visitation disputes to include anyone who maintains a
functional parental relationship with a child when a legally recognized parent created that
relationship with the intent that the relationship be parental in nature." Polikoff, supra note I,
at 464.
207 See supra notes 202-06 and accompanying text for a discussion of the current complexi-
ties facing courts when considering custody and guardianship awards.
208 See supra notes 18-134 and accompanying text for a discussion of the three courts
permitting second parent adoptions.
209 5ee supra notes 18-134 and accompanying text for a discussion of courts allowing adop-
tions based on legislative intent to embody child's best interests in the adoption statute.
510 See supra notes 140-207 and accompanying text for an application of this reasoning to
the situation where a third parent seeks to adopt a child.
211 See supra notes 140-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the adoption
statutes neither precluded this adoption, nor required termination of parents' rights.
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implement the best interests of the child, which may include recogni-
tion of more than two parental relationships. 212
First, such recognition provides enhanced financial and emotional
stability for the child. 2 Is Second, it acknowledges the reality of many
children's daily lives. 214
 Third, to the extent that such recognition
challenges the structure of the nuclear family, many families already
do not conform to such a structure. 215
 Fourth, although dissolution of
the relationships between the multiple parents may lead to complex
custody cases, such complexities already exist and lack the guidance
that a legally validated relationship could give.216 Hence, courts should
grant legal recognition, in the form of permitting an adoption, to the
relationship between a child and every one of his or her parents. 217
ELIZABETH ROVER BAILEY
212 See supra notes 161-207 and accompanying text for a discussion of how recognizing more
than two parental relationships could advance the best interests of the child.
213 See supra notes 161-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of how such an adoption
enhances the child's emotional and financial well-being.
214 See supra notes 171-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of children's day-to-day
lives and interactions with adults.
215 See supra notes 184-201 and accompanying text for a discussion of the myriad versions
of family.
216 See supra notes 202-07 and accompanying text for a discussion of extant complexities of
guardianship and custody disputes.
217
 See supra notes 135-207 and accompanying text for a discussion of why a court should
not limit a child to two parents.
